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NOW YOU SEE ME: PROBLEMS AND 
STRATEGIES FOR INTRODUCING GENDER 
SELF-DETERMINATION INTO THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT FOR GENDER 
NONCONFORMING PRISONERS 
LIZZIE BRIGHT*  
As the fight for transgender rights becomes more visible in the United 
States, the plight of incarcerated transgender individuals seeking medical 
care behind bars is likewise gaining attention—and some trans prisoners are 
gaining access to gender-affirming care.  However, progress for 
incarcerated members of the trans community has been slow, piecemeal, and 
not without problems.  As federal court opinions in Eighth Amendment 
access-to-care cases brought by trans prisoners show, how a court interprets 
the subjective intent requirements of the Eighth Amendment and how the 
imprisoned plaintiff pleads his/her/their case can make or break the claim.  
Further, courts and plaintiffs rely on medical diagnoses often couched in 
fixed binary transition to make a cognizable constitutional claim for medical 
care. For incarcerated gender nonconforming (“GNC”) individuals, the 
established binary-based medical diagnoses increasingly accepted by courts 
and prison officials may not reflect GNC individuals’ gender identities or 
medical needs.  However, utilizing updated medical standards that enable 
patient gender self-determination in Eighth Amendment claims may extend 
Eighth Amendment protection to GNC people in American prisons.  
Deploying medical standards that are not aimed at binary transition in 
Eighth Amendment litigation can provide an avenue for incarcerated GNC 
individuals both to regain some power of gender self-determination and to 
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of Law, 2018. Thanks to Laura for her unconditional love and support throughout this process. 
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ensure GNC prisoners have access to the gender-affirming medical care to 
which they are entitled. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 138 
I. BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 140 
II. STANDARDS OF CARE: CONVENTIONAL AND EMERGING 
MODELS .................................................................................. 145 
A. GNC-Inclusive Models of Care ....................................... 146 
B. Fixed Binary Models of Care .......................................... 146 
C. Models of Care and the Eighth Amendment ................... 148 
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: LOOKING AT EVERYONE EXCEPT THE 
PRISONER ................................................................................ 150 
A. The Basic Framework: Serious Medical Need and 
Deliberate Indifference .................................................... 150 
B. Deference to Medical Knowledge ................................... 152 
IV. CASE LAW: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR GNC 
PLAINTIFFS .............................................................................. 156 
A. Challenges: When Courts Let Prisons Use Their Own 
Problematic Experts and Policies to (Mis)Treat Inmates 156 
B. Opportunities: Shifting Subjectivity and Refocusing on the 
Prisoner ............................................................................ 160 
C. A Case that Could Win? .................................................. 166 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 169 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans have become more aware of issues facing the transgender 
community in the past several years—Caitlyn Jenner’s “coming out,” 
Laverne Cox’s role on Orange is the New Black, and Gavin Grimm’s case 
challenging a school’s bathroom policy have all garnered national attention.1  
Laverne Cox has spoken publicly about the plight of transwomen in prison,2 
 
1  See, e.g., Moriah Balingit, Gavin Grimm just wanted to use the bathroom. He didn’t 
think the nation would debate it., WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/gavin-grimm-just-wanted-to-use-the-
bathroom-he-didnt-think-the-nation-would-debate-it/2016/08/30/23fc9892-6a26-11e6-ba32-
5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html?utm_term=.ec2767706b40; Kathleen Parker, Opinion: Caitlyn 
Jenner’s Coming Out, WASH. POST (June 2, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
caitlyn-jenners-coming-out/2015/06/02/da17bb80-095f-11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story. 
html?utm_term=.5f5b0cdbaef3; Jazz Jennings, The 100 Most Influential People: Laverne Cox, 
TIME (Apr. 16, 2015), http://time.com/collection-post/3822970/laverne-cox-2015-time-100/.  
2  See, e.g., Shannon Vestal Robson, Laverne Cox Gives a Hint About Sophia’s Season 4 
Storyline on OITNB, POP SUGAR (Jan 19, 2016), http://www.popsugar.com/entertainment/ 
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and “[t]he issue of whether a transsexual3 person is entitled to hormone 
therapy or sex-reassignment surgery while in prison has been litigated 
extensively.”4  Yet, virtually no cases have been brought by prisoners seeking 
gender-affirming5 care that is not aimed at fixed binary “male to female” or 
“female to male” transition.  Most problematically, even correctional6 
facilities that do have protocols in place providing for medical care for 
transgender inmates7 tend to use standards of care that cover only fixed 
binary transition.8 
In her article Feminism and the (Trans)gender Entrapment of Gender 
Nonconforming Prisoners, Julia Oparah details the experiences of a gender 
nonconforming (GNC) former prisoner, Bakari.9  Bakari, who identifies as 
genderqueer,10 which to them means neither wholly male nor female, was 
 
Laverne-Cox-Quote-About-Trans-Women-Prison-2016-39833058 (discussing harsh 
conditions transwomen face in prison, including solitary confinement). 
3   Some courts and sources use the outdated term “transsexual” to mean transgender. 
Where sources have used this word, I have left it in.  I have also left in where sources use the 
term “transgendered” rather that transgender. 
4  Karen Moulding & National Lawyers Guild, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
Committee, Access to Medical Treatment in Prison, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 
10:26 (2016). 
5  See Jae Puckett, Research Blog—Barriers to Gender-Affirming Care for Transgender 
and Gender Non-conforming Individuals, IMPACT: THE LGBT HEALTH DEV. PROGRAM (Dec. 
10, 2015), http://www.impactprogram.org/research-blog/research-blog-barriers-gender-
affirming-care-transgender-gender-non-conforming-individuals/#sthash.GkJdfxmS.dpbs. 
Gender-affirming care refers to a variety of medical treatments, including hormones and 
surgery.  Id.  
6  I used this term as another word for “prison”—I do not believe prisons serve any 
legitimate corrective or rehabilitative function. 
     7  I will periodically use the terms “prisoner” and “inmate” to describe people who are 
incarcerated.  This is meant only as shorthand, not as language intended to dehumanize the 
overwhelming number of people incarcerated in the United States. 
8  See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF TRANSGENDER INMATES 
11 (Dec. 2016), available at https://www.bop.gov/resources/pdfs/trans_guide_dec_2016.pdf 
(“Feminizing treatment is generally the more complex of the two gender-affirming regimens” 
compared to masculinizing treatment) (emphasis added).  The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ 
guide provides care guidelines only for male-to-female and female-to-male inmates—that is, 
only for inmates seeking fixed binary transition.  Id. at 11–19. 
9  Julia C. Oparah, Feminism and the (Trans)gender Entrapment of Gender 
Nonconforming Prisoners, 18 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 239, 239–40 (2012).  “They/their” is 
sometimes used as a singular pronoun by gender nonconforming and genderqueer individuals. 
Id.  
10  Genderqueer is often synonymous with gender nonconforming. See CTR. OF 
EXCELLENCE FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR THE PRIMARY AND GENDER-
AFFIRMING CARE OF TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NONBINARY PEOPLE 15 (Madeline B. 
Deutsch ed., 2d ed. 2016) (“Genderqueer is another term used by some with [the gender 
nonconforming] range of identities”) [hereinafter “UCSF”].  For a discussion of specifically 
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housed in a California prison according to their perceived biological sex.11  
While “penal systems are premised on the existence of a rigid gender binary,” 
Bakari asserted their “right to gender self-determination, including the right 
to embrace a shifting and fluid gender identity.”12  People like Bakari exist in 
this country’s many prisons, and they face high hurdles to receive the gender-
affirming medical care they deserve as human beings. 
Showing courts, which defer to medical expertise in their Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, that there are medical protocols inclusive of GNC 
identities is a viable first step in this process of restoring gender self-
determination to GNC prisoners.  This Note will examine strategies and 
barriers to getting GNC-competent medical protocols in front of courts, with 
the goal of challenging the prevailing prison medical regime of fixed binary-
based care and ultimately moving the law toward a self-determinative model 
of gender identity.13 
I. BACKGROUND 
While locked up, Bakari observed higher levels of victimization of 
gender nonconforming prisoners by staff, such as punishing individuals 
within the “women’s” prison who grew facial hair.14  Prison abolition group 
Black and Pink’s 2015 report likewise found that nearly 80% of trans and 
gender nonconforming (“TGNC”) prisoners experienced emotional suffering 
as a result of having to conceal their gender while locked up.15  The report 
also found that over a third of TGNC individuals surveyed had used 
hormones prior to being incarcerated, and 44% reported being denied 
hormones once incarcerated.16  While the overall prevalence of TGNC 
individuals in the U.S. may be low, this community is disproportionately 
represented in America’s correctional system: almost one in six transgender 
people in the U.S. has been locked up in a state or federal prison, and nearly 
 
genderqueer identity, see LGBTQ+ Definitions, TRANS STUDENT EDUC. RES., 
http://www.transstudent.org/definitions (last visited June 9, 2017).  
11  See Oparah, supra note 9, at 240. 
12  Id. 
13  For a brief examination of gender self-determination and the granting of discrete legal 
rights to marginalized groups, see Eric A. Stanley, Gender Self-Determination, 1 TSQ: 
TRANSGENDER STUD. Q. 19, 89 (2014). 
14  See Oparah, supra note 9, at 241.  
15  JASON LYDON ET AL., COMING OUT OF CONCRETE CLOSETS, BLACK & PINK 1, 4 (Oct. 21, 
2015), http://www.blackandpink.org/wp-content/upLoads/Coming-Out-of-Concrete-Clos 
ets.-Black-and-Pink.-October-21-2015.-Executive-Summary-and-Recommendations.pdf 
(using the terms “transgender, nonbinary gender, and Two-Spirit” to describe TGNC 
individuals).  
16  See id. 
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half of all black transgender Americans have been incarcerated.17  Forty-three 
percent of the TGNC-identified individuals surveyed by Black and Pink had 
a diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder or Gender Dysphoria (“GID” or 
“GD”), and nearly one-third of TGNC prisoners were denied a GID/GD 
diagnosis when they sought one.18  One of these two diagnoses is typically 
required before accessing gender-affirming care in prison.19  While it is 
becoming more common for prisons to provide hormone therapy for some 
transgender inmates and, for example, for prisons to allow transwomen to 
wear feminine clothing in prison, access to surgery and care for all TGNC 
people behind bars is far from the norm.20 
It is vital to note that many of the transgender inmates seeking gender-
affirming care in American prisons likely do identify within the binary—
meaning as men or women, and not as a non-binary gender(s).21  Their claims 
and the courts’ binary-based responses might therefore accurately reflect 
plaintiffs’ self-identification (though even after a hard-fought gender-
validating win in court, transgender inmates face heightened levels of 
 
17  See Esinam Agbemenu, Medical Transgressions in America’s Prisons: Defending 
Transgender Prisoners’ Access to Transition-Related Care, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 1–
2 (2015).  There is a high likelihood GNC prisoners are lumped into the “transgender” category 
for prison statistics.  “The broad category of transgender encompasses both pre and post-
operative transgender individuals, genderqueer individuals, cross-dressers, the androgynous, 
and other gender non-conforming people.”  Id. at 9.  
18  LYDON ET AL.,  supra note 15, at 4.  GD has become the more accepted term, but because 
some cases cited also use the term GID, I will use both terms in tandem.  See Camille 
Beredjick, DSM-V to Rename Gender Identity Disorder ‘Gender Dysphoria,’ THE 
ADVOCATE (July 23, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2012/07/ 
23/dsm-replaces-gender-identity-disorder-gender-dysphoria. 
19  See Agbemenu, supra note 17, at 2–3. 
20  See Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 246 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding prison 
officials violated the Eighth Amendment in denying care, including providing feminine 
clothing that the plaintiff prisoner’s “medical providers indicated were necessary for her 
treatment”); see also Moulding & National Lawyers Guild, supra note 4 (explaining that 
hormone access is more available as a result of litigation but that access to surgery remains 
inconsistent). 
21  See Oparah, supra note 9, at 246–47 (“Although transgender and transsexual are not 
synonyms, case law generally focuses on the experiences of male-to-female transsexuals” with 
courts relying on binary-based GID diagnosis “[r]ather than challenging the gender binary.”).  
All of this is not to say that transgender plaintiffs in any type of suit share a universal goal of 
“passing” for a cisgender person—many are proud to be transgender.  This Note also does not 
seek to demean transgender individuals as lesser than GNC individuals, or even to artificially 
divide the TGNC community into those who are transgender and those who are GNC, when 
individuals may identify as both.  Rather, this Note seeks to examine how courts and resulting 
law may treat incarcerated individuals who seek gender-affirming care that is not necessarily 
aimed at binary transition, and what challenges to binary care models are available.  
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violence back in prison).22  In healthcare access just as in what has come to 
be whitewashed as the “gay rights movement,” transgender individuals, 
especially transwomen of color, are trailblazers.23  It is their claims of a right 
to gender-affirming care that will continue to pave the way, now and in the 
future, for care that is not couched in binary transition. 
The case law surrounding transgender prisoners has focused mostly on 
the experiences of transwomen.24  The reliance of courts on medical 
diagnosis pathologizes transgender persons, granting them rights only when 
they are defined as abnormal or sick.25  Excluded from legal protections are 
those who do not seek diagnosis or medical care in relation to their gender 
identity.26  Also excluded are those who do seek care but not with a goal of 
permanent transition from one end of the binary to the other.27  For example, 
a GNC person who seeks temporary hormone therapy to achieve certain 
secondary sex characteristics but not others28 may be denied treatment under 
the current diagnostic regime and may not have the sort of binary-based 
evidence of medical need (for example, a constant lifelong desire to live as 
“the opposite sex”29) currently relied on by courts in Eighth Amendment 
 
22  LYDON ET AL., supra note 15, at 5 (e.g., LGBTQ survey respondents were six times 
more likely to be sexually assaulted in prison than other inmates, and TGNC individuals are 
targeted more severely than lesbian, gay, and bisexual inmates). 
23  See Kamms, Never Forget #024: Transwomen of Color Kickstarted the Gay Rights 
Movement (Stonewall), THE VISIBILITY PROJECT (May 26, 2016), http://www.thevisibility 
project.com/2016/05/26/never-forget-transwomen-of-color-kickstarted-the-gay-rights-
movement-stonewall-uprising/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
24  Oparah, supra note 9, at 246 (citing Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing: 
Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 522 
(2000)).  The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment enables 
prisoners to sue for denial of medical care in prison.  See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97 (1976). 
25  See Oparah, supra note 9, at 246–47; see generally Silpa Maruri, Hormone Therapy for 
Inmates: A Metonym for Transgender Rights, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807 (2011). 
26  See Oparah, supra note 9, at 247.  For example, an inmate may seek non-medical 
interventions such as chest binding to express gender. 
27  See Hannah Mogul-Adlin, Unanticipated:  Healthcare Experiences of Gender 
Nonbinary Patients and Suggestions for Inclusive Care, 5–7 (2015) (master’s thesis, Yale 
School of Public Health), available at http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/ysphtdl/1197 
(describing the medical profession’s conception of “transgenderedness” as based on 
permanent binary transition from one sex to the “opposite sex”). 
28  See FTM Testosterone Therapy Basics, HUDSON’S FTM RES. GUIDE, http://www. 
ftmguide.org/ttherapybasics.html (last visited May 23, 2017).  Only some effects of 
testosterone—voice change and hair growth, for example—are permanent after a period of “t” 
(testosterone) usage, while other effects, such as fat placement on the body, may revert to pre-
t placement once hormone therapy is stopped.  Id. 
29  See, e.g., Rowe v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-827, 2010 WL 3779561, at *4 
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:08CV827, 2010 WL 
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litigation. 
Numerous authors have tackled the issues arising from transgender 
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment access to medical care claims from the lens of 
pathology.30  Medical diagnosis reinforced by legal standards defines TGNC 
individuals on terms set by doctors and courts—rather than allowing TGNC 
individuals to define themselves.31  The end result is the perpetuation of 
“simplistic binaries, which squeeze out anything or anyone that doesn’t fit” 
but that are legible to mainstream society.32  What remains less discussed 
than the pathologizing of transgender persons via binary-based medical 
diagnosis is the elimination of gender fluidity and non-binary identities under 
the current legal-medical regime.  In particular, the current structure of 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence does not allow room for gender self-
determination and instead emphasizes the subjective view of prison officials 
and institutional medical opinion.33  GNC prisoners may be forced to bring 
their Eighth Amendment denial of care claims in the mold of binary-
transition-care claims instead of as GNC individuals.  But newer GNC-
inclusive medical standards that enable patients to self-define their identities 
already exist, and these standards are one way to undo the erasure of GNC 
prisoners under the current Eighth Amendment denial-of-care regime.  
Although the integration of these newer guidelines into the case law is a real 
challenge for prisoners, a handful of cases demonstrate possible pitfalls and 
paths to getting non-binary conceptions of gender in front of the courts. 
The issue addressed in this Note—how to achieve gender self-
 
3779437 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation from prison 
policy defining “gender identity disorders” as binary-based: “A person with a gender identity 
disorder is unhappy with his/her biological sex, and desires to be considered a member of the 
opposite sex.”). 
30  See, e.g., Tara Dunnavant, Bye-Bye Binary: Transgender Prisoners and the Regulation 
of Gender in the Law, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 15, 21 (2016) (discussing medical models of gender 
that “pathologize gender transgression”); see also Franklin H. Romeo, Note, Beyond A 
Medical Model: Advocating for A New Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 718 (2005) (describing the “medical model, in which gender 
nonconformity is explained as a psychological condition most appropriately treated through 
medical services”).  
31  See Dunnavant, supra note 30 at 21–22.  I use GNC to mean people within the greater 
TGNC umbrella who do not necessarily define themselves as transgender but who identify as 
gender nonconforming. 
32  Id. at 22. 
33  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 826 (1994) (reiterating that the Eighth Amendment 
has a subjective prong requiring officials to be “aware” of risks to inmates); Fields v. Smith, 
653 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court finding of Eighth Amendment 
violation where defendant prison officials, including medical staff, “knew of the serious 
medical need but refused to provide hormone therapy” to transgender inmates) (emphasis 
added). 
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determination for TGNC prisoners by litigating standards of care not based 
on a fixed gender binary—is but a tiny piece of the TGNC-equality puzzle.  
Other authors have already noted that equal protection claims are often a 
“losing strategy” for transgender plaintiffs because the Supreme Court 
appears unwilling to expand those classifications receiving heightened 
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.34  Equal Protection arguments 
may not leave room for true gender self-determination beyond the binary if 
Equal Protection is based on fixed “immutable” traits—though immutability 
itself may not be sacrosanct in determining suspect classifications.35  The 
criminalization of TGNC people—particularly of gender nonconforming 
individuals36 and transwomen of color37—has far-reaching consequences that 
necessitate multiple approaches.  As with other intersecting marginalized and 
surveilled communities, the effects of criminalization of TGNC individuals 
impacts their access to housing, education, and employment.38  The very fact 
that a body of case law exists dealing with access to gender-affirming care 
for TGNC individuals behind bars is a symptom of the greater penalization 
of the TGNC community.39  In order to dismantle the systemic oppression of 
TGNC individuals, litigants and activists must deploy multiple strategies 
inside and outside the courtroom—and always under the leadership of the 
TGNC community.  This Note is intended only to outline one possible—and 
imperfect—route for moving toward self-determination for a subset of the 
 
34  See Sarah Halbach, Comment, Framing A Narrative of Discrimination Under the 
Eighth Amendment in the Context of Transgender Prisoner Health Care, 105 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 463, 471–72 (2015).  Halbach notes that, in the employment context, courts are 
becoming more willing to extend equal protection and Title VII protections to transgender 
individuals.  Id. at 473; see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(holding discrimination against transgender individuals is “sex-based discrimination that is 
subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause”). 
35  See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (finding the immutability of a 
trait is a factor in the Equal Protection analysis); see also Chinyere Ezie, Deconstructing the 
Body: Transgender and Intersex Identities and Sex Discrimination-the Need for Strict 
Scrutiny, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 141, 180 (2011) (discussing the history and current place 
of immutability in the Equal Protection framework).  
36  Quick Guide to the Criminalization of Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming 
People, TRANSFORMATIVE JUST. L. PROJECT OF ILL., https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/ 
publications/Guide%20to%20Criminalization%20of%20Trans%20%26%20Gender%20Non
Conforming%20People%20Transformative%20Justice%20Law%20Proj.%20of%20IL.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2017). 
37  Dina Kopansky, Locked Out: How the Disproportionate Criminalization of Trans 
People Thwarts Equal Access to Federally Subsidized Housing, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 125, 137 
(2014). 
38  See id. at 126, 128. 
39  See id. at 142 (explaining that the incarceration rate for transgender individuals is “far 
higher than the incarceration rate for non-trans people”). 
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TGNC community in the United States 
II. STANDARDS OF CARE: CONVENTIONAL AND EMERGING MODELS 
The medical model of gender, which utilizes psychiatric diagnosis of 
Gender Identity Disorder/Gender Dysphoria (“GID”/“GD”) to legitimize 
transgender status in the eyes of the law, can secure rights for transgender 
individuals.40  But the currently dominant iteration of the medical model 
“assumes that two genders exist and enforces the norms typically associated 
with these genders.”41  The medical model has enabled access to rights and 
protections, but at a cost: the binary gets reinforced, permanent transition 
within two options is required, and GNC plaintiffs remain out in the cold.42  
The medical model also “sets up the medical establishment as a gatekeeping 
institution that regulates gender nonconformity and predicates legal rights on 
access to health care,”43 all of which plays out in Eighth Amendment claims.  
As will be explored in depth below, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment44 applies when prisoners are denied 
adequate medical care.45  To make a successful Section 198346 claim for a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment based on, for example, the right to 
adequate medical treatment, a prisoner must successfully allege both that the 
need for medical care was serious47 and that the prison officials subjectively 
knew of the need for care.48  Eighth Amendment cases involving deprivation 
of medical care often turn on the medical opinions and expertise of prison 
doctors.49  Like the Eighth Amendment requirement of subjective knowledge 
and accompanying deference to medical opinion, officials and doctors are the 
ones with the power to diagnose and define the imprisoned plaintiff’s gender 
 
40  See Romeo, supra note 30, at 725. 
41  Id. at 724–25.  
42  Id. at 726–27. 
43  Id. at 730. 
44  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
45  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
46  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  Section 1983 allows individuals to sue when the 
government has violated a constitutional right.  It is the statutory vehicle for prisoners to sue 
prisons when prisons fail to meet Eighth Amendment standards of medical care and is 
independent of the Eighth Amendment’s jurisprudential framework.  
47  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
48  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also De’Lonta v. Angelone 
(De’Lonta I), 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[the Eighth Amendment] requires that a 
prison official actually know of and disregard an objectively serious condition, medical need, 
or risk of harm.”). 
49  See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. 
Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (holding that the district court erred in part by 
improperly “substituting its own beliefs for those of multiple medical experts”). 
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under the traditional medical model. 
A. GNC-INCLUSIVE MODELS OF CARE 
The binary medical model is no longer the only model of care for TGNC 
individuals.  Professional literature that includes fluid and non-binary 
genders exists.  The American Psychological Association (“APA”) published 
its Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and Gender 
Nonconforming People in 2015.50  The APA Guidelines affirm that gender 
identity may be non-binary and fluid.51  Likewise, the Center of Excellence 
for Transgender Health at the University of California, San Francisco’s 
Guidelines for the Primary and Gender-Affirming Care of Transgender and 
Gender Nonbinary People (“UCSF Guidelines”) provide a model of 
treatment for GNC individuals that accommodate fluid and non-binary 
identities,52 such as providing lower doses of hormones for limited periods of 
time rather than requiring permanent use of treatments that aim to transition 
someone from one end of the binary to the other.53  The UCSF Guidelines 
stress that the GNC patient’s identity should guide his/her/their own care and 
that a GNC individual’s “authentic [gender] expression” may include 
characteristics and treatments that others see as mismatched or not 
identifiable as purely masculine or feminine.54  UCSF’s Guidelines take the 
approach that individuals seeking gender-affirming care have “differing 
desires for gender-affirming treatments.”55  Finally, the UCSF Guidelines 
contrast their approach with the approach still holding sway in transgender 
prisoner cases: “In contrast to past practices in which a set pathway involved 
a requirement of psychological assessment → hormones → genital surgery, 
the current standard of care is to allow each transgender person to seek only 
those interventions which they desire to affirm their own gender identity.”56 
B. FIXED BINARY MODELS OF CARE 
Many prison systems in the U.S. now provide gender-affirming care for 
at least some transgender inmates.57  The most recent edition of the 
 
50  Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and 
Gender Nonconforming People, 70:9 AM. PSYCHOL. 832, 836, 862 (2015). 
51  Id. at 836, 862. 
52  See CTR. OF EXCELLENCE FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 10, at 15 (use of GNC-
inclusive terminology). 
53  See id. at 70. 
54  See id. at 70–71. 
55  Id. at 17. 
56  Id. at 23. 
57  See Moulding & National Lawyers Guild, supra note 4. 
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-V”), 
meanwhile, pays mere lip service to GNC individuals.58  The DSM-V, also 
called the “psychiatrist’s bible,”59 is used in multiple correctional systems in 
the United States60 and appears frequently in the case law dealing with TGNC 
inmates.61  The DSM-V’s diagnostic scheme for gender dysphoria, which is 
in widespread use in prisons, requires six months of feeling “marked 
incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned 
gender” and at least two of a menu of symptoms: 
1.  A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and primary 
and/or secondary sex characteristics (or in young adolescents, the anticipated 
secondary sex characteristics). 
2.  A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics 
because of a marked incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender (or in 
young adolescents, a desire to prevent the development of the anticipated 
secondary sex characteristics). 
3.  A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other 
gender. 
4.  A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender different from 
one’s assigned gender). 
5.  A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative gender different 
from one’s assigned gender). 
6.  A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other gender 
(or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender).62 
The DSM-V’s first two diagnostic options assume one has to feel a 
 
58  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS § 302.85 (2013).  
59  Lila Leonard, Gender Reassignment Surgery in Prisons: How the Eighth Amendment 
Guarantees Medical Treatments Not Covered by Private Insurance or Medicare for Law-
Abiding Citizens, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 626, 629–30 (2014) (citing Dana Beyer, The 
End of Transgender as a Mental Illness, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2012, 9:34 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dana-beyer/theendof-transgender-as-a-mental-illness_b_ 
2238147.html).  
60  See Thomas A. Fulks & Sonya Khilnani, Diagnosing Mental Illness: What Does the 
DSM-5 Mean for Corrections?, CORRECTIONS (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.corrections.com/ 
news/article/37711-diagnosing-mental-illness-what-does-the-dsm-5-mean-for-corrections-; 
Ashley Hughes, Transgender Prisoners and the Law, 23 PRO SE 1, 1 (2013), 
https://nebula.wsimg.com/36240e9309608e53e6b242b12d0201e1?AccessKeyId=58077DB5
116E2803DCE5&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 (describing the DSM-V in the transgender 
prisoner context as “the manual medical professionals use to classify mental health 
conditions”). 
61  See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 550 (7th Cir. 2011). 
62  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 58, at § 302.85. 
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mismatch between, for example, one’s breasts and one’s gender identity to 
get the benefits of a gender dysphoria diagnosis, when, as the UCSF report 
points out, one can have both “breasts and facial hair as part of authentic 
expression.”63  Item Three assumes there is some defined static “other 
gender,” while items Four and Five presuppose a defined, implicitly opposite 
“other gender” with “alternative gender”64 tacked on.  Item Six presupposes 
that there are “typical feelings and reactions”65 of one’s desired gender 
identity, which flies in the face of gender as a fluid and self-determined—
rather than a cookie cutter two-sizes-fit-all—identity.  In 2012, the DSM-V 
did change its terminology from GID to GD in an effort to better capture 
GNC individuals, with one member of the American Psychiatric Association 
admitting “there is a whole community of people out there who . . . live 
between the two binary categories.”66  Though the DSM-V moved further 
“away from the gender binary, making the condition more inclusive for those 
people who do not fit neatly into one gender category,”67 serious issues with 
its diagnostic criteria remain—particularly in terms of gender fluidity and 
acknowledging that some people identify with what could be called “mixed 
sex characteristics.”68  Even the World Professional Association of 
Transgender Health’s (“WPATH”) newest standards of care (also used by 
prisons and thus by courts) have a hierarchy of identity: “[a]ccording to 
WPATH, although nonconformity to gender roles is common, it does not 
always rise to the level of gender dysphoria.”69  Many GNC individuals just 
do not meet the requirements of GID/GD as set out by the widely-used DSM-
V or WPATH.70 
C. MODELS OF CARE AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
The Eighth Amendment and, thus, “the Constitution require 
individualized assessment by medical providers, rather than decision-making 
 
63  UCSF, supra note 10, at 71. 
64  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 58, at § 302.85. 
65  Id. 
66  Beredjick, supra note 18.  
67  Halbach, supra note 34, at 481. 
68  Id. 
69  Dunnavant, supra note 30, at 25.  WPATH also acknowledges that care should be 
“individualized,” but courts may use this as a means to deny the need for surgery, as the 
Kosilek en banc court did.  WPATH’s Standards of Care are not widely accessible to the 
public, though downloads are available for a fee of $45.00. See Standards of Care – Historical 
Compilation of Versions 1–6, WPATH, http://www.wpath.org/site_store_product.cfm?store_ 
product=38&display_category=0 (last visited Oct. 25, 2017). 
70  See Romeo, supra note 30, at 731. 
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by administrators to bar entire classes of treatment.”71  Medical providers and 
the medical protocols they rely on decide who has a valid Eighth Amendment 
claim in front of the court.72  Indeed, “[w]ithout a clear diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria, it may be challenging to convince a court of the urgency of the 
individual’s medical need,” and thus, an Eighth Amendment claim will 
always fail.73  The medical and psychological literature, even the DSM-V 
with its parenthetical attempts to include GNC individuals, is moving toward 
recognizing gender as non-binary and fluid.74  Yet courts, through the binary-
based medical literature still in common use, remain dependent on static and 
binary notions of gender to assess the claims of transgender prisoners seeking 
care, using fixed binary language and evidence to validate gender identity in 
a way that excludes GNC persons while establishing rights to care for some  
transgender persons seeking fixed binary transition.  Court reliance on such 
increasingly outdated conceptions of gender75 plays into both the Eighth 
Amendment’s requirement of subjective knowledge on the part of officials 
tasked with providing care to inmates and the diagnoses meeting the 
objective requirement.  Depending on how courts construct the subjective 
prong of the Eighth Amendment—the requirement that prison officials or 
medical staff know what the inmate’s medical need is—there is more or less 
room for newer GNC-inclusive medical opinions to influence courts.  For 
example, the more a court evaluates the subjective intent of an official sued 
under the Eighth Amendment through a reasonableness lens, the more room 
there is for a new medical opinion.  The more a court abdicates its inferential 
 
71  Moulding & National Lawyers Guild, supra note 4, at § 10:26. 
72  See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 855–56 (E.D. Wis. 2010), supplemented 
(July 9, 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 
94 F.3d 254, 261–62 (7th Cir. 1996)) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment requires 
“medical treatment” to be far outside of conventional standards for a claim to succeed).  What 
care medical staff provides and how that care measures up to the medical profession’s own 
standards makes or breaks an Eighth Amendment argument: “deliberate indifference may be 
inferred based upon a medical professional’s erroneous treatment decision only when the 
medical professional’s decision is such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the 
decision on such a judgment.” Id. 
73  Moulding & National Lawyers Guild, supra note 4, at § 10:26. 
74  See Halbach, supra note 34 at 481. 
75  See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 73, 78, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2014) (emphasizing 
the need for GID patients to have “real-life experience” in a “cross gender role”).  The prison 
officials’ language is taken up by the court, and “real-life experience” based on “family” and 
“social relationships” suggests living as a widely discernible, binary gender, while the 
language of “cross-gender” roles sounds like transition from one end of the binary to another, 
rather than allowing for a fluid gender identity.  Id.  Ultimately, the Kosilek court decided there 
is “no support for the district court’s conclusion that no reasonable medical expert could opine 
that [Michelle] Kosilek lacked real-life experience.”  Id. at 88. 
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power to objectively evaluate subjective knowledge of care options, the less 
room there is for new medical opinions. UCSF-type standards of care may 
enter the picture depending on how educated on TGNC inmates an official 
must be in order to claim that his response to an inmate’s needs was 
reasonable.  The differing approaches courts take to evaluate official 
knowledge and granting deference to prison medical staff can determine how 
willing a court is to let standards other than the DSM-V, WPATH, or a 
prison’s own guidelines into their opinions. 
Medical theories of gender are not perfect—they pathologize and 
disempower individuals who are forced to seek medicine to validate their 
humanity in the eyes of the law—but there are more inclusive standards of 
care available that can make room for gender self-determination behind 
prison walls.  Such inclusive medical standards will get litigated under the 
Eighth Amendment.76 
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: LOOKING AT EVERYONE EXCEPT THE 
PRISONER 
A. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK: SERIOUS MEDICAL NEED AND 
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE 
Trans and gender nonconforming people are overrepresented in prison 
populations,77 and their attempts to get adequate care are governed by the 
Eighth Amendment.78  In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court decided that, 
in denial of medical care cases, “deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”79  This standard applies to 
doctors providing the care and other officials denying or delaying access to 
medical services—though it does not apply to accidents.80  Some level of 
intent is required of the bad actors.81  In Farmer v. Brennan, a case that 
 
76  See Dan Manville, Federal Legal Standards for Prison Medical Care, PRISON LEGAL 
NEWS (May 15, 2003) https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2003/may/15/federal-legal-
standards-for-prison-medical-care/ (giving an overview of Eighth Amendment prison medical 
care litigation).  
77  See Romeo, supra note 30, at 714–15. 
78  See Leonard, supra note 59, at 642 (“[T]he [Fields] court held that ‘[p]rison officials 
violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when they 
display deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’”) (citing Fields v. Smith, 
653 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted)). 
79  429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal citation omitted). 
80  Id. at 104–06. 
81  See id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[B]y its repeated references to ‘deliberate 
indifference’ and the ‘intentional’ denial of adequate medical care, I believe the Court 
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notably dealt with violence against a transwoman that her jailers failed to 
prevent, the Supreme Court readdressed the issue of denial of care and built 
upon the reasoning of Estelle.82  In Farmer, the Court declined to adopt an 
objective test for deliberate indifference, instead requiring the plaintiff 
prisoner to show that the prison official had actual knowledge of the risk at 
hand: 
. . . [A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying 
an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and 
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware 
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 
exists, and he must also draw the inference.83 
Estelle and Farmer set out a daunting task for prisoners seeking to make 
Eighth Amendment denial of care claims: 1) the medical need must be serious 
(objective), 2) the actions of the prison officials in denying care must be 
intentional (subjective), 3) those officials must know the facts giving rise to 
the risk (subjective), 4) the officials must then connect those facts to the risk 
(subjective), and 5) the officials must not have taken reasonable action to 
lessen the risk of harm (subjective, in that reasonableness is judged in light 
of official knowledge of the risk).84 
Medical diagnoses serve two functions under this Eighth Amendment 
framework.  First, they meet the objective prong to show that the medical 
need of the prisoner was serious.85  Second, an official’s knowledge of such 
 
improperly attaches significance to the subjective motivation of the defendant as a criterion 
for determining whether cruel and unusual punishment has been inflicted.”).  The Estelle 
majority is careful to skirt an intent requirement, stating that the Eighth Amendment is violated 
when “the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs 
or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care . . . .”  Id. at 
104–05.  The exclusion of “accidents” and “inadvertent” denials of care by prison staff makes 
intent a practical necessity for Eighth Amendment claims. See id. at 105–06.  The intent 
requirement became more robust in Wilson v. Seiter, a conditions of confinement case: “The 
source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of this Court, but the Eighth 
Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is not 
formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element 
must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.” 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991). 
82  511 U.S. 825, 828–29, 835 (1994) (“This case requires us to define the term ‘deliberate 
indifference [first set out in Estelle v. Gamble],’ as we do by requiring a showing that the 
official was subjectively aware of the risk.”). 
83  Id. at 837. 
84  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–06.  For a concise delineation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s subjective and objective framework in the caselaw, see De’Lonta v. 
Angelone (De’Lonta I), 330 F.3d 630, 633–34 (4th Cir. 2003). 
85  See Dunnavant, supra note 30, at 29.  At least in the First Circuit, plaintiffs can also 
show a serious medical need when it is “so obvious that even a lay person would easily 
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”  Mahan v. Plymouth Cty. House of Corr., 64 
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a diagnosis can meet the subjective prong by showing an official was aware 
of and then deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s need for care.86  
Important to the possibilities for the proposed solution of introducing GNC-
inclusive care standards, the “responded reasonably to the risk”87 defense for 
officials may give them room to choose what care is adequate to meet a 
GID/GD diagnosis—or not. 
The Eighth Amendment has a particular relationship to medicine, and 
TGNC prisoners bringing claims under it rely on medical definitions of 
gender identity to meet the Eighth Amendment’s intricate obstacle course of 
requirements for liability.88  Not surprisingly, courts defer to medical 
expertise in determining what counts as a serious medical need and what 
constitutes deliberate indifference to the need. 
B. DEFERENCE TO MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE 
The Eighth Amendment’s two prong test relies heavily on medical 
expertise—objectively by looking for institutional medical opinion of when 
gender identity deserves treatment through diagnosis, and subjectively 
through prison officials’ knowledge of the prisoners’ identities and care 
options.  While prison officials and medical staff have latitude89 in 
diagnosing and treating GID/GD, state legislatures setting limits on gender-
affirming care for transgender inmates may not be treated so kindly by courts.  
In the landmark trans rights case Fields v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit struck 
down Wisconsin’s ban on providing hormone therapy for transgender 
 
F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995).  Whether a lay person will identify the need of a transgender 
person, never mind a potentially even more foreign-seeming GNC person, as in need of gender 
affirming care is debatable and worthy of much more research.  
86  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge 
of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including 
inference from circumstantial evidence.”) (emphasis added).  Farmer adds that if “the 
circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information 
concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it, then such evidence could be 
sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of 
the risk.”). Id. at 842–43.  But this is not the same as a lower should-have-known standard; 
such a should-have-known “inference cannot be conclusive, for we know that people are not 
always conscious of what reasonable people would be conscious of.” Id. at 842 (internal 
quotations omitted).  Ultimately, Farmer makes clear “prison officials who lacked knowledge 
of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment.”  Id. at 844. 
87  Id. at 844. 
88  See Halbach, supra note 34, at 479.  Halbach’s article also provides a useful discussion 
of the various critiques of the medical model’s ways of defining gender identity. 
89  See, e.g., Rowe v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-827, 2010 WL 3779561, at *7 
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:08CV827, 2010 WL 
3779437 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010).  The leeway prison officials have to make care 
decisions for inmates is discussed in depth below. 
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prisoners as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.90  The Seventh Circuit 
found that because the defendants failed to proffer evidence that alternative 
treatments for GID/GD were effective, the blanket ban on hormone therapy 
did not “constitutionally limit the discretion of physicians,”91 but instead 
eliminated the discretion of these physicians and thus constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment92—reiterating the primacy of medical standards to which 
prison officials are held.  The Fields court distinguished Wisconsin’s ban on 
hormone therapy for prisoners from the so-called partial birth abortion ban 
upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Carhart, which prevents doctors 
from performing certain abortion procedures: “Carhart is not helpful to 
defendants in this case because they did not present any medical evidence 
that alternative treatments for GID are effective.”93  Importantly, the Supreme 
Court upheld the ban in Carhart in part because the “Court has given state 
and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where 
there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”94  The implication is that medical 
expertise has the power to restore legislative authority to outlaw certain 
treatments, even in the face of constitutional challenges like those posed by 
prisoners seeking adequate medical care.  It is not surprising then that 
multiple transgender prisoner cases turn on the medical expertise of prison 
officials. 
The First Circuit’s decision in Kosilek v. Spencer, which overturned a 
district court order requiring the Massachusetts Department of Corrections 
(“DOC”) to provide gender-affirming surgery to a transwoman, lambasts the 
district court for “substituting its own beliefs for those of multiple medical 
experts” in its order to the DOC.95  In the First Circuit, adequate medical care 
for Eighth Amendment purposes is defined as care “measured against 
‘prudent professional standards.’”96  The District Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin, affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in Fields, likewise 
held “deliberate indifference may be inferred ‘when the medical 
professional’s decision is such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the 
 
90  Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011). 
91  Id. at 556–57. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. at 557. 
94  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007). 
95  774 F.3d 63, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S. 
Ct. 2059 (2015). 
96  Nunes v. Mass. Dep’t of Correction, 766 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing United 
States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987)).  DeCologero defined care within 
medical standards as “services at a level reasonably commensurate with modern medical 
science.” 821 F.2d at 43.  Care approaching the medical norm is adequate.  
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person responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment.’”97  
Violation of the Eighth Amendment is in large part determined based on the 
care standards used by doctors treating prisoners.98  In Rowe v. Correctional 
Medical Services Inc., where a transwoman’s attempt to get an injunction 
enabling her access to hormones, a bra, and outside medical opinion was 
denied, the court reiterated judicial deference to medical expertise in Eighth 
Amendment denial of care cases: “where the prisoner is receiving treatment 
with the dosage levels based on the considered professional judgment of a 
physician, this court is reluctant to second-guess that judgment.”99  In Rowe, 
the court further stated: “[t]he Sixth Circuit has never required the trial court 
to substitute its judgment for that of the medical providers who treat the 
transsexuals on a day-to-day basis.”100 
This deference to medical expertise presents obstacles to the prisoner 
seeking to base his/her/their claim on a less binary-focused medical standard: 
treatment based on medical standards, no matter how backward and binary, 
may negate an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.101  In 
Kothmann v. Rosario, however, the Eleventh Circuit denied a motion to 
dismiss brought by the Chief Health Officer (“CHO”) of the Florida 
Department of Corrections when transman Sebastian Kothmann was denied 
gender-affirming care (testosterone) and sued.102  The Kothmann court found 
that the CHO’s awareness that Kothmann had GID, that Kothmann was 
seeking hormone treatment for GID, and that “in the medical community, 
hormone therapy is the medically recognized, accepted and appropriate 
treatment for GID” were enough to meet the subjective test of the Eighth 
 
97  Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 855–56 (E.D. Wis. 2010), supplemented (July 9, 
2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 
254, 261–62 (7th Cir. 1996).  Pardue noted, “deliberate indifference may be inferred based 
upon a medical professional’s erroneous treatment decision only when the medical 
professional’s decision is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision 
on such a judgment..”  Pardue, 94 F.3d at 261–62. 
98  Rowe v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-827, 2010 WL 3779561, at *6 (W.D. 
Mich. Aug. 18, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:08CV827, 2010 WL 
3779437 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010) (“[W]here the prisoner is receiving treatment, the 
dosage levels of which are based on the considered professional judgment of a physician, 
courts are reluctant to second-guess the physician’s judgment.”). 
99  Id. at *7. 
100  Id. at *8. 
101  See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 108 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Kosilek 
v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (discussing the Kosilek 
majority’s allowance for the Massachusetts Department of Corrections to cherry pick medical 
opinions on which to base care for trans prisoners). 
102 558 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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Amendment.103  Likewise, in De’Lonta v. Angelone, the Fourth Circuit 
reversed a district court’s dismissal of a transgender prisoner’s Eighth 
Amendment claim at summary judgement.104  The Fourth Circuit held that 
“[i]n dismissing De’lonta’s suit, the district court incorrectly determined, 
based on the limited record before it, that the suit was nothing more than a 
challenge to the medical judgment of [Virginia Department of Corrections] 
doctors.”105  Rather than assuming doctors base their decisions in medical 
protocol and deferring accordingly, the Fourth Circuit questioned whether 
the decision to deny De’Lonta care was based on medical opinion at all.106  
Thus, deference to medical expertise does not necessarily give carte blanche 
to prison medical staff to determine what constitutes appropriate treatment. 
Deference to medical expertise is a double-edged sword under the 
Eighth Amendment: medical expertise can strip prisoners of their power to 
self-determine their gender, reinforce the binary, and preclude court 
examination of treatment regimens, but it also provides an avenue whereby 
new conceptions of gender identity can be recognized under the law and old 
binary standards may be challenged.107  Current medical provider 
competency in caring for transgender and GNC patients—in and outside the 
penitentiary—is not perfect even for endocrinologists who prescribe 
hormones.108  However, with more medical professionals seeking and 
accessing training in caring for TGNC patients,109 the Eighth Amendment’s 
deference to medical knowledge could prove a powerful tool for GNC 
inmates seeking non-binary care while locked up.  Of course, medical 
education must continue expanding the training all providers receive 
regarding care for the TGNC community.110  Getting more prisoner-
 
103  Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App’x 907, 911 (11th Cir. 2014). 
104  330 F.3d 630, 631 (4th Cir. 2003).  Note that the courts involved in Ophelia De’Lonta’s 
multiple suits against Virginia prison officials alternatively spell her name De’lonta and 
De’Lonta. 
105  Id. at 634. 
106  Id. at 635. 
107  Diagnosis also may depoliticize GID/GD cases, easing pressure on prison officials to 
deny treatments that members of the public may not want their tax money paying for. See 
Halbach, supra note 34, at 487.  “The [District of Massachusetts in Michelle Kosilek’s 2002 
case regarding hormones] warned, however, that if the []DOC Commissioner were to base his 
decision on concerns about cost or political controversy, he would violate the Eighth 
Amendment.”  Id. 
108  See Anna Almendrala, Doctors Want to Learn More About Treating Transgender 
Patients, Survey Shows, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 7017, 8:18 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/promising-doctors-survey-reveal-positive-attitude-
toward-transgender-patients_us_5876a220e4b05b7a465d9fa4. 
109  See id. 
110  See generally Jordan Aiken, Promoting an Integrated Approach to Ensuring Access to 
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empowering standards of care in front of courts that will accept such 
expertise is the key to a litigation-based solution that utilizes the growing 
TGNC-competence of medicine. 
IV. CASE LAW: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR GNC PLAINTIFFS 
Eighth Amendment claims regarding gender-affirming care have thus 
far been brought by transgender-identified prisoners.111  It is those cases that 
illustrate the interplay between the Eighth Amendment’s subjective and 
objective standards and courts’ reliance on a binary medical-legal conception 
of gender.  Some cases provide openings for GNC-inclusive standards of 
care, whereas others do not.112 
A. CHALLENGES: WHEN COURTS LET PRISONS USE THEIR OWN 
PROBLEMATIC EXPERTS AND POLICIES TO (MIS)TREAT INMATES 
While the First Circuit in Kosilek noted that “GID is a serious medical 
need, and one which mandates treatment, [and that issue] is not in dispute in 
this case,” it nonetheless found that the Eighth Amendment does not mandate 
surgery with a diagnosis of GID.113  Kosilek held, “[t]he choice of a medical 
option that, although disfavored by some in the field, is presented by 
competent professionals does not exhibit a level of inattention or callousness 
to a prisoner’s needs rising to a constitutional violation.”114  At first, the 
court’s reasoning here seems to give weight to alternative medical views of 
gender, perhaps alternatives to the binary of the DSM-V as laid out by courts 
that favor newer medical guidelines that take account of GNC identities.  
However, differing interpretations of one standard of care (which had a fixed 
 
Gender Incongruent Health Care, 31 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1 (2016). 
111  See Oparah, supra note 9, at 246 (citing Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing: 
Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 512 
(2000)).  
112  See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 92 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. 
Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (holding courts “do not sit to substitute [their] own 
judgment for that of prison administrators” when prison administrators make decisions 
regarding health care regimens and security measures).  But see Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. 
App’x 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prison official would not be liable for an 
Eighth Amendment violation if she could “establish that Kothmann ‘received adequate mental 
health treatment for his GID’” rather than just for the symptoms the prison treated him for) 
(citing Kothmann v. Rosario, No. 5:13-CV-28-OC-22PRL, 2013 WL 12096653, at *5 (M.D. 
Fla. June 6, 2013), aff’d, 558 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2014)) (emphasis in circuit and district 
court opinions). 
113  Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86.  The Kosilek court acknowledged that the DSM-V terminology 
changed from GID to gender dysphoria but kept using GID because it was the term used 
throughout most of the case’s lengthy litigation history.  Id at 68 n.1. 
114  Id. at 91–92. 
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binary “real life experience” requirement) is one of the grounds on which the 
First Circuit reversed the district court: 
We find no support for the district court’s conclusion that no reasonable medical expert 
could opine that Kosilek lacked real-life experience, particularly in light of the contrary 
testimony from medical experts concerning the range of social, environmental, and 
professional considerations that are necessary to constitute a real-life experience under 
the Standards of Care.115 
The First Circuit also found fault with what it characterized as the 
district court “ignor[ing] significant contrary evidence regarding the breadth 
and variety of acceptable treatments for GID within the medical 
community.”116  In Kosilek, multiple possible methods of caring for TNGC 
prisoners allows for denial of care.117  Under the Kosilek framework there is 
not subjective deliberate indifference if the denial is based on some medical 
opinion, even the most restrictive among other options.  This is the Eighth 
Amendment’s reasonable risk prevention liability shield at its most extreme, 
with no evaluation of what is reasonable beyond that the prison officials 
sought some form of medical expertise to justify the lack of care provided to 
Michelle Kosilek.118 
The First Circuit refuses to read objective reasonableness into the 
subjective prong: “[m]oreover, a later court decision—ruling that the prison 
administrators were wrong in their estimation of the treatment’s 
reasonableness—does not somehow convert that choice into one exhibiting 
the sort of obstinacy and disregard required to find deliberate 
indifference.”119  In Kosilek, a strong subjective Eighth Amendment prong 
requires a higher showing of official state of mind from the plaintiff.  
Combined with a low threshold for what counts as medical expertise, this 
approach resulted in the denial of care to an incarcerated transwoman. 
Rowe v. Correctional Medical Services, like Kosilek, held that a 
prisoner’s treatment regime is up to prison medical staff to decide—not for 
the prisoner to have a say in beyond requesting medical care.120  Rowe relied 
 
115  Id. at 88. 
116  Id. at 89. 
117  See id. at 82–83 (citing Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1980) (The 
subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment “does not impose upon prison administrators a 
duty to provide care that is ideal, or of the prisoner’s choosing” and Eighth Amendment claims 
that “‘simply reflect a disagreement on the appropriate course of treatment . . . fall[ ] short of 
alleging a constitutional violation.’”). 
118  See id. at 91–92 (citing precedent indicating deliberate indifference is not met when 
the dispute centers not on the absence of treatment but the choice of a course of treatment). 
119  Id at 92. 
120  See No. 1:08-CV-827, 2010 WL 3779561, at *8, *9 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2010), 
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:08CV827, 2010 WL 3779437 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 
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on Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) policies that were 
explicitly binary.121  The MDOC policies stated, “[a] person with a gender 
identity disorder is unhappy with his/her biological sex, and desires to be 
considered a member of the opposite sex” and “has a longstanding desire to 
replace his or her own physical sexual characteristics . . . with those of the 
opposite sex.”122  Rowe is adamant in its deference to internal prison policies 
regarding GID treatment over external and established medical expertise, 
even under a standard of review that is meant to be deferential to the plaintiff 
trying to fight the defendant officials’ motion for summary judgment.123  The 
Rowe court adds, “the court is not bound to blindly adopt a non-moving 
party’s version of the facts.”124  Note that this is a departure from the approach 
taken toward summary judgment in De’Lonta I discussed above and 
below.125  The court assumes the MDOC policy is “sound medical judgment”: 
“the [15-month] delay in authorizing hormone therapy treatment was based 
on the sound exercise of medical judgment, as set forth in the Policy 
Directive.”126  In denying the prisoner’s request to have an outside medical 
evaluation done regarding her GID, the court notes, “plaintiff disagrees with 
the prescribed course of treatment as a transsexual” and gives the plaintiff’s 
view no weight.127 The Rowe opinion ultimately held that the “plaintiff has 
no cause of action under the Eighth Amendment to require a specific 
treatment, such as the requested hormone therapy or a bra.”128  Rowe refused 
to examine the adequacy of care—one means of questioning the standards of 
care prisons are using—under the Eighth Amendment, essentially finding 
 
22, 2010) (citing Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir.1976)) (noting federal 
courts “are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments” made by prison staff and 
that the “plaintiff has no cause of action under the Eighth Amendment to require a specific 
treatment, such as the requested hormone therapy . . .”). 
121  Id. at *4. 
122  Id.  
123  Id. at *3 (citing McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000)) 
(“‘In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court views the factual evidence and draws 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.’”). 
124  Id. 
125  See De’Lonta v. Angelone (De’Lonta I), 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (“‘A complaint should not be dismissed . . . 
unless after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and 
drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor, it appears 
certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to 
relief.’”) (emphasis added)).  The difference in each court’s acceptance level of the plaintiff’s 
version of the facts in Rowe and De’Lonta I pushes toward opposite results in each case. 
126  Rowe, 2010 WL 3779561, at *6. 
127  Id. at *9. 
128  Id. 
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that some level of treatment is automatically enough to bar deliberate 
indifference: “[a]s a general rule, ‘[w]here a prisoner has received some 
medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, 
federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and 
to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.’”129  Attacking 
prison policies directly is not a winning strategy under Rowe: because 
“MDOC physicians undertook testing and examinations before authorizing 
the hormone therapy consistent with the requirements of Policy Directive,” 
they are not liable for deliberate indifference during the over one-year period 
when the plaintiff did not receive hormones.130  The Rowe court emphasizes 
the prison’s policy rather than the harm caused to the plaintiff or the adequacy 
of the knowledge of the defendant officials. 
As Judge Thompson’s dissent concludes, the Kolisek majority “enables 
correctional systems to further postpone their adjustment to the crumbling 
gender binary.”131  When courts enable wide prison discretion over choice of 
care for inmates, a prison doctor can select a treatment plan that does not fit 
an inmate’s needs as long as long as it is based on some “competent” medical 
opinion, no matter how much other experts disagree with that opinion.132  
Kosilek’s and Rowe’s use of established binary-based conceptions of gender 
in GID diagnoses foreclose treatment of GNC inmates as the inmates 
themselves conceive of it and as emerging medical experts acknowledge. 
Thompson’s scathing dissent spells out the implications: the majority 
“gives correctional departments serious leeway with the Eighth Amendment.  
If they do not want to provide a prisoner with care recommended by one or 
more than one medical provider, they need only find a doctor with a differing 
mind set (typically not a difficult task).”133  But there are bright spots—other 
courts’ Eighth Amendment jurisprudence pokes holes in prison officials’ 
power to deny care for TGNC inmates. 
 
129  Id. at *8 (internal citations omitted).  The “some” treatment standard of Rowe also 
seems to conflict with the individualized care requirement of the Eighth Amendment.  See, 
e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 91 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Kosilek v. 
O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mentioning “the requirement that medical care be 
individualized based on a particular prisoner’s serious medical needs”). 
130  Rowe, 2010 WL 3779561, at *7. 
131  Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
132  See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 91–92 (“The choice of a medical option that, although 
disfavored by some in the field, is presented by competent professionals does not exhibit a 
level of inattention or callousness to a prisoner’s needs rising to a constitutional violation.”). 
133  Id. at 108. 
BRIGHT 1/27/18  2:30 PM 
160 BRIGHT [Vol. 108 
B. OPPORTUNITIES: SHIFTING SUBJECTIVITY AND REFOCUSING ON 
THE PRISONER 
In Kothmann v. Rosario, the court softened the Eighth Amendment’s 
subjective prong where Kosilek hardened it.  Kothmann’s attribution of 
subjective knowledge to the Chief Health Officer (Rosario) based on the 
existence of a recommended GID treatment pushes the limits of Farmer’s 
clarification that circumstantial evidence can be used to “suggest that the 
defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning 
the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it,” enabling the trier of fact to 
infer actual subjective knowledge.134  Reviewing the district court ruling de 
novo but assuming the facts in Kothmann’s complaint to be true, the Eleventh 
Circuit went the extra mile and stuck with the inference that it was possible 
Rosario had actual knowledge certain treatment protocols were the required 
(reasonable) way to treat Sebastian Kothmann, thereby slipping an objective 
evaluation into their assessment of Rosario’s actions.135  Kothmann also 
rejected Rosario’s argument that the treatment she provided—counseling—
was enough since “inmates are entitled to some form of treatment, but not 
necessarily their preferred method.”136  The Eleventh Circuit found that 
because the hormone treatment Kothmann sought was medically necessary, 
Rosario had to provide it.137 
The court’s assumption that Rosario was aware of what the care 
guidelines for transgender inmates are softens the subjective prong of the 
Eighth Amendment into something more akin to the objective approach 
favored by Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Farmer: “a state official may 
inflict cruel and unusual punishment without any improper subjective 
 
134  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842–43 (1994). 
135 Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App’x 907, 911 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e hold that 
Kothmann has alleged facts sufficient to show that Rosario knew that hormone treatment was 
the recognized, accepted, and medically necessary treatment for Kothmann’s GID, yet 
knowingly refused Kothmann’s repeated requests for such treatment . . .”).  Kothmann seems 
to turn a defense available in Farmer on its head: while “prison officials who actually knew 
of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they 
responded reasonably to the risk,” by providing counseling for example, Kothmann says an 
unreasonable response, such as providing only counseling, counts against an official.  Harm 
to the inmate is not the emphasis of Farmer’s reasonableness of response analysis, and thus 
Farmer implicitly sets a lower bar for officials to meet than Kothmann: “In addition, prison 
officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free 
from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not 
averted.”  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 
136  Kothmann, 558 F. App’x at 911–12. In Kothmann, the treatment was “hormone 
treatment . . . the accepted, medically necessary treatment for Kothmann’s GID.”  Id. at 912. 
137  See id.  
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motivation.”138  The Kothmann court did not care if Rosario had an improper 
subjective motive here; the court saw her departure from the standard GID 
treatment as objectively unreasonable and her knowledge that the protocols 
existed as enough subjective intent to meet the Eighth Amendment standard 
of deliberate indifference.139 
The bright spot in Kothmann, despite its reliance on binary diagnosis,140 
is the framework it provides: the existence of a medical opinion that a course 
of treatment is “medically necessary,” or even reasonable in the court’s eyes, 
can work to override the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment, at least 
to get past a 12(b)(6) motion.141  Established-by-the-prison standards of care 
and the subjective intent of the official (however backward)142 who plays 
gatekeeper to care can be overcome by an objective reasonableness analysis, 
which sneaks in under the Farmer allowance for courts to make an inference 
of subjective knowledge based on surrounding facts.143 
Like Kothmann, De’Lonta v. Angelone—the Fourth Circuit case that 
reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment against a transwoman 
seeking hormones in prison—examines the decisions of medical personnel 
with a grain of skepticism,144 leaving the door open for plaintiffs to challenge 
the actual standards of care used by prisons.  The Fourth Circuit rejected the 
district court’s characterization of the case as “nothing more than a challenge 
to the medical judgment of [prison] doctors” and thus outside the bounds of 
the Eighth Amendment.145  Based upon memos between prison doctors and 
the prison’s policy not to provide gender-affirming care to inmates, the 
 
138  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring on stare decisis grounds). 
139  Kothmann, 558 F. App’x at 911 (“Rosario knew that hormone treatment was the 
recognized, accepted, and medically necessary treatment for Kothmann’s GID, yet knowingly 
refused Kothmann’s repeated requests for such treatment and thus was deliberately indifferent 
to a serious medical need.”).  Knowledge, not intent, drove the court’s analysis. 
140  See id. at 909.  The court looked at fixed identity to evaluate Kothmann’s diagnosis: 
“[Kothmann] was diagnosed with GID in 2005 and, since that time, he has been under a 
doctor’s care and has ‘regularly taken prescribed testosterone, except when [he] was prevented 
from doing so by [his] incarceration.’”  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. at 908. According to Kothmann, Rosario “‘vetoed’ a prison doctor’s referral of 
Kothmann to the endocrinology staff, who could prescribe hormone treatment, because 
[Rosario believed] ‘endocrinology is not for cosmetic issues.’”  Id. 
143  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a 
substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including 
inference from circumstantial evidence.”). 
144  See, e.g., 330 F.3d 630, 635 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that one prison doctor’s denial of 
care to De’Lonta “was based solely on the Policy rather than on a medical judgment 
concerning De’lonta’s specific circumstances”). 
145  Id. at 634. 
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De’lonta I court inferred that the prison officials’ decision to deny care was 
“based solely on the Policy rather than on a medical judgment concerning 
De’lonta’s specific circumstances.”146  Such grounds for a medical decision 
are inadequate because they are not medical opinion at all—medical 
standards must be standards, not mere decisions that happen to be made by 
medical staff.147  The court points out that “nothing in the record suggests 
that [the defendant-official’s] opinion was a basis for the denial of De’lonta’s 
requested treatment.”148  Rather than readily defer to the prison’s medical 
staff, the De’Lonta I court scrutinized the care the prison provided by making 
clear what was not in the record: “nothing in the record refutes the allegation 
that Appellees know that De’lonta’s compulsive self-mutilation began after 
the discontinuation of her hormone therapy.”149  The court continued: 
“Moreover, Dr. Marsh’s memo is at most only a comment on the 
appropriateness of one possible treatment and does not refute De’lonta’s 
claim that she has not received any treatment to suppress her compulsion to 
mutilate herself.”150  The Fourth Circuit was not willing to sustain the 
dismissal of a trans prisoner’s claim by filling in the medical blanks, instead 
requiring the defendant doctors to make clear the medical basis of their 
decisions and defend their expertise via the record.151  The De’Lonta I court 
even required the defendants to “demonstrate” for the limited treatment 
De’Lonta received to purportedly alleviate her “compulsion” to self-harm 
“that the treatment was provided for that purpose or that it was deemed to be 
a reasonable method of preventing further mutilation.”152  The court 
demanded that defendants show that their treatment plan was “reasonable” 
rather than show that they subjectively thought it to be acceptable care153—
leaving room for a challenge based on newer, more GNC-friendly  standards 
of care.  The court added that it “make[s] no comment on the type of 
treatment, if any, to which D’lonta is entitled,”154 indicating that medical 
 
146  Id. at 635. 
147  See id. (emphasizing that medical opinion and not mere prison policy must be the basis 
for care decisions). 
148  Id. (emphasis added). 
149  Id. at 634. 
150  Id. at 635. 
151  See id. (pointing out that “nothing in the record suggests that [prison physician] Dr. 
Marsh’s opinion was a basis for the denial of De’lonta’s requested treatment” and that “policy” 
took the place of “medical judgment” in treating De’Lonta) (emphasis added). 
152  Id. (emphasis added). 
153  Id. at 634–35 (agreeing with De’Lonta that her care “was abruptly terminated for no 
legitimate reason” even though the prison provided evidence that doctors were involved in 
De’Lonta’s case). 
154  Id. at 636. 
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opinion retains power to turn the case.  But the Fourth Circuit decision 
punched out an opening for better medical opinion to get in front of the court 
and set at least a higher bar prison that medical opinion must meet in showing 
the reasonableness of the basis of the care prisons provide (or deny) to defeat 
an Eighth Amendment suit.  Because the Fourth Circuit demanded the prison 
doctors show the medical support for their denial of care and the doctors 
failed to do so, Ophelia De’Lonta’s Eighth Amendment claim survived 
summary judgement.155  For Eighth Amendment plaintiffs appealing 
dismissal at summary judgement, De’Lonta I provides a template for closer 
court scrutiny of prison medical staff decisions to deny care.156 
In Wolfe v. Horn, where a transwoman who had already been prescribed 
hormones before she was incarcerated and was subsequently denied 
hormones in prison, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that “abrupt 
termination of prescribed hormonal treatments by a prison official with no 
understanding of Wolfe’s condition, and failure to treat her severe 
withdrawal symptoms or after-effects, could constitute ‘deliberate 
indifference.’”157  Jessica Wolfe’s case suggests that medical knowledge of a 
condition is necessary when care is denied or the denying official faces an 
Eighth Amendment claim.158  More importantly, Wolfe, like Kothmann and 
De’Lonta I, takes a step toward evaluating prison officials via objective 
criteria, holding that “deliberate indifference” is “essentially a subjective 
standard” but that “objective factors may inform the viability of a ‘deliberate 
indifference’ claim.”159  Here, one of those factors was the fact that officials 
without adequate knowledge of gender-affirming care were involved in 
decision-making.160  This puts the onus on prison officials to allow only those 
educated about the needs of transgender inmates to make decisions regarding 
their care and gives prisons some motive to stay current on standards of care 
that are more GNC-inclusive. 
Norsworthy v. Beard provides a useful model for courts and litigants to 
shrink the subjective shield the Eighth Amendment hands to defendants that 
rely on their own binary-based medical standards in treating TGNC 
 
155  Id. at 635–36. 
156  See generally De’Lonta v. Angelone (De’Lonta I), 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003). 
157  130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
158  Id.  Wolfe uses the Farmer v. Brennan allowance for an inference of knowledge, 
pushing toward objective reasonableness and away from subjective intent prong of the Eighth 
Amendment: “‘deliberate indifference’ is [a] fact question which may be demonstrated 
through circumstantial evidence that risks were obvious.”  Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 842 (1994)). 
159  Id. at 652 n.6. 
160  Id. at 653. 
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inmates.161  In Norsworthy, the court found that the plaintiff prisoner, 
Michelle-Lael Bryanna Norsworthy, had stated an Eighth Amendment claim 
for injunctive relief to receive gender-affirming surgery.162  The court 
allowed her claim to move forward and let her question the extent of the 
prison officials’ expertise in trans care: “The Court agrees with Norsworthy’s 
contention that she should have the opportunity to explore the Defendants’ 
motives and the extent and nature of their knowledge through discovery.”163  
It is key to the Norsworthy court’s Eighth Amendment analysis that the 
plaintiff be able to question the standard of care used by officials: 
“[d]efendant’s argument that Norsworthy’s medical indifference claim must 
fail because she received some treatment for her gender dysphoria is also 
unconvincing, as a prisoner need not prove that she was completely denied 
medical care in order to prevail.”164  Norsworthy gets at the adequacy of the 
care the prison provided in alleviating the prisoner’s medical problem, rather 
than shrugging off the question of adequacy when the prisoner gets some 
treatment, no matter how limited.165  This gives her an opportunity to attack 
the prison’s treatment regimen itself and provides the opening to propose 
better guidelines.166 
Prison treatment plans are not invincible to Eighth Amendment attacks, 
and Diamond v. Owens illustrates that a prisoner can challenge prison 
policies that define and limit what counts as GID/GD worthy of medical 
 
161  87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
162  Id. 
163  Id. 
164  Id. 
165  See id. at 1118 (holding that “[b]ecause there is no recommendation by a treating 
physician or other medical provider against sex reassignment surgery, this is not a case in 
which prison staff have simply reviewed and affirmed medical decisions made by others” and 
thus that defense is unavailable to the defendant prison officials.).  In other words, Norsthworth 
does not let officials who denied care escape all liability based on the fact that no doctor 
actively ordered care but instead places a burden on prison staff to justify what they did based 
on medical opinion.  See also Wolfe v. Horn, 130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting 
that “while Wolfe may have received some medical attention in prison, there is a fact question 
as to whether Wolfe received any treatment for transsexualism” rather than just for depression, 
lending credence to Wolfe’s deliberate indifference claim) (emphasis added). 
166  See Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1117–18 (viewing skeptically “that after 
Norsworthy’s treating psychologist explicitly recommended sex reassignment surgery, 
Norsworthy was removed from his care and [a prison doctor with no experience treating trans 
patients] was assigned to prepare a pretextual report recommending that sex reassignment 
surgery be denied”).  The court then allowed Michelle Norswrothy’s claim to proceed to 
discovery, enabling further exploration of the defendant doctors’ and officials’ motives for 
denying her care in the face of another doctor’s recommendation she receive surgery.  Id. at 
1118. 
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treatment.167  Ashley Diamond, a transwoman incarcerated in Georgia, 
challenged the Georgia Department of Corrections’ (“GDOC”) “freeze 
frame” policy, which mandated care only for inmates identified as 
transgender at intake or who had a “history” of receiving gender-affirming 
care in the past.168  The GDOC rules are steeped in a conception of fixed 
gender,169 but more importantly, the court was willing to question the 
GDOC’s policies based on the prison’s outright denial of care.170  The policy 
conflicted with elements of established care standards used by prison 
psychologists which prescribed hormones as the necessary treatment for 
Diamond’s diagnosis.171  Like Ophelia De’Lonta in Virginia, Ashley 
Diamond got her claim past dismissal.172  Diamond succeeded by alleging 
facts sufficient to show that 
the Defendants knew the medically accepted and recognized gender dysphoria 
treatment pursuant to the [WPATH] Standards of Care; knew about Diamond’s 
diagnosis . . . and communicated with her directly about her gender dysphoria.  But they 
knowingly and repeatedly refused her requested treatment, refused to refer her for 
treatment, and, at most, prescribed or authorized treatment—psychotropic drugs and 
counseling—they knew was medically inadequate.173 
In Diamond, medical staff could not skate by on court deference to their 
own views of gender-affirming care or prison policies when facts are 
presented that they were aware of external standards, at least at the pleading 
stage.174  The potential result is that prison care guidelines do not always 
 
167  131 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1353 (M.D. Ga. 2015). 
168  Id. at 1354.  Diamond also alleged that the prison guards failed to protect her from 
sexual assault while she was incarcerated, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 1353.   
Because medical care, and not the additional serious problem of violence against transwomen 
in prison, is the subject of this Note, I will not be focusing on the assault element of Ashley 
Diamond’s case.  It is worth noting that the court did not dismiss Diamond’s failure to protect 
claim, nor did it grant qualified immunity to prison guards who failed to protect her from 
assault behind bars.  Id. at 1368–69, 1379–80. 
169  See id. at 1353, 1354 (noting the prison’s policy assumed gender affirming care was 
an on/off switch that was flipped at intake, and even if a person who had a previous diagnosis 
and prescription for hormone therapy was locked up, that individual only received 
“maintenance” level hormone therapy—not the level his/her/their condition medically 
required).  
170  Id. at 1354, 1372–73 (describing Diamond’s allegation that the GDOC’s “‘freeze-
frame policy[]’ prevented medical professionals from initiating treatment for gender 
dysphoria” and taking as true that she was given care that was “medically inadequate 
pursuant to the Standards of Care” instead of the GDOC policy). 
171  See id. at 1356–57. 
172  Id. at 1353. 
173  Id. at 1373. 
174  Id. at 1372–73 (holding that Ashley Diamond’s “allegations, taken as true, 
sufficiently show the Defendants were subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious 
harm” when such allegations included “(1) all Defendants were aware of the medically 
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override external medical standards.  Plaintiffs who can show prison officials 
have some awareness of external care standards may be able to attack the 
standards used by the prison and force a shift toward more GNC-inclusive 
care models. 
C. A CASE THAT COULD WIN? 
To get a court to let in medical opinion that restores some gender self-
determination to GNC inmates, the incarcerated plaintiff must plead in such 
a way that invites courts to adopt the closer scrutiny of official knowledge of 
appropriate care deployed by the Kothmann, Norsworthy, Diamond, 
De’Lonta, and Wolfe courts, instead of the reasonable prevention of risk 
option to avoid liability championed in Kosilek and Rowe.  A complaint 
emphasizing the continued suffering of the plaintiff and presenting enough 
facts to enable a court to infer that there are standards of care that would 
alleviate such suffering may do the job of flipping emphasis from subjective 
knowledge to something closer to objective reasonableness.  Objective 
reasonableness and a shift in focus to the real human prisoner provide a path 
to challenge the subjective view of prison officials that their version of 
treatment is good enough to dodge Eighth Amendment liability.  For claims 
facing summary judgment, emphasizing the holes the defendants left in the 
record regarding the medical basis of their decisions a la De’Lonta I175 or 
presenting facts enough to show officials were aware of multiple standards 
of care as in Diamond176 are viable strategies to extend litigation into a stage 
where Eighth Amendment subjectivity can further be eroded in favor of the 
TGNC prisoners being denied care. 
Norsworthy provides the best model.  Michelle-Lael Norsworthy made 
her successful claim by emphasizing not “that Defendants ‘should have 
known’ that sex reassignment surgery was medically necessary . . . [but] 
[r]ather . . . that Defendants were fully aware that Norsworthy faces a serious 
medical need for sex reassignment surgery and failed to address her ongoing 
 
accepted and recognized treatment for gender dysphoria pursuant to the Standards of Care, 
which includes hormone therapy and gender expression; (2) all Defendants knew 
psychotropic drugs and counseling alone were medically inadequate pursuant to the 
Standards of Care . . .”). 
175  See De’Lonta v. Angelone (De’Lonta I), 330 F.3d 630, 635 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding, 
for example, that “nothing in the record suggests that [a prison doctor’s] opinion was a basis 
for the denial of De’lonta’s requested treatment” based on the record presented by the 
defendant officials). 
176  See Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1372–73 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (finding 
that Diamond’s allegations, taken as true, did show from facts including her repeated suicide 
attempts and medical history with a GD diagnosis that the “[d]efendants were aware of the 
medically accepted and recognized treatment for gender dysphoria pursuant to the Standards 
of Care” and yet denied Diamond such care). 
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anguish.”177  This switch from what prison officials decide is a medical 
necessity to their awareness of the prisoner’s suffering enabled Norsworthy 
to get past the defense that there was merely a “disagreement between her 
various caregivers” and thus no deliberate indifference since a course of 
treatment that did not allow for gender-affirming surgery was chosen by 
officials with multiple “legitimate” options.178  It may be troubling to goad 
courts into action by requiring gruesome prisoner suffering before the Eighth 
Amendment is met,179 but it returns the focus to the actual prisoner and gives 
space to question standards of care and whether or not the standards prisons 
use are actually working to prevent harm to inmates.  Norsworthy then had 
room to utilize the opinion of one caregiver who prescribed her the desired 
treatment over the objections of prison officials180—officials who often 
receive deference, as they did in Kosilek and Rowe.  Norsworthy points to 
officials’ subjective awareness that their preferred bare-bones treatment plans 
were not reducing harm to the plaintiff as possibly being enough to make an 
Eighth Amendment claim.181  A claim structured this way enables outside 
medical opinion that disagrees with prison policy to become part of the case. 
De’Lonta v. Angelone provides a useful template for Eighth Amendment 
claims facing summary judgement.182  Ophelia De’Lonta’s eight-year quest 
 
177  Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1117–18 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
178  Id. at 1118. 
179  Farmer v. Brennan specifically aimed to foreclose such a requirement that the risk of 
harm from denial of care became real harm under the Eighth Amendment: “Consistently 
with this principle, a subjective approach to deliberate indifference does not require a 
prisoner seeking ‘a remedy for unsafe conditions to await a tragic event such as an actual 
assault before obtaining relief.’” 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994) (internal citations omitted).  For a 
discussion of how requiring suffering from inmates before care will be mandated is 
problematic, see Danielle Matricardi, Binary Imprisonment: Transgender Inmates Ensnared 
Within the System and Confined to Assigned Gender, 67 MERCER L. REV. 707, 724 (2016) 
(“Thus, jurisdictions that focus on gender dysphoria’s physical manifestations severely limit 
redress for inmates with gender dysphoria who do not display drastic symptoms of suicide or 
self-harm.”).  The path this Note advocates does not require a catastrophic event like a 
suicide attempt to occur before the claim can be litigated but moves to reemphasize the 
perspective of the prisoner in shaping his/her/their own care.  Id. 
180  See Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1118 (finding that Norsworthy stated a claim for 
deliberate indifference in part because she was pretextually removed by prison officials from 
the care of a psychologist who recommended gender affirming surgery). 
181  See id. at 1117–18 (holding Norsworthy’s complaint made a cognizable Eighth 
Amendment claim because it “does not allege that Defendants ‘should have known’ that sex 
reassignment surgery was medically necessary[, but r]ather, it alleges that Defendants were 
fully aware that Norsworthy faces a serious medical need for sex reassignment surgery and 
failed to address her ongoing anguish”). 
182  See 330 F.3d 630, 631 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Because we conclude that it does not appear 
beyond doubt that De’lonta cannot prove facts to support her claim, we reverse and remand 
for further proceedings.”). 
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to obtain hormones behind bars,183 which included “an injunction requiring 
[the prison] to arrange for her to be treated by a doctor with expertise in 
transsexualism,”184 inched forward—eventually to a settlement between 
De’Lonta and the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) whereby 
De’Lonta would receive hormone therapy.185  In Ophelia De’Lonta’s case, 
VDOC even consulted with a “an outside Gender Identity Specialist” to 
provide De’Lonta the care she sought.186  VDOC’s officials let in new 
medical standards following De’Lonta’s first victory in the Fourth 
Circuit187—showing judicial deference to prison medical staff under the 
Eighth Amendment framework is not above challenge.  While procedurally 
winning reversal of a summary judgement motion is not a win on the 
merits,188 such a victory at the appellate level can be a powerful bargaining 
chip for settlement as De’Lonta I shows.  By emphasizing the lack of medical 
expertise presented by prison officials in the record, the De’Lonta I court 
enabled the plaintiff to fill the gaps left by the prison doctors, reassert her 
identity, and eventually access a medical expert who actually met her needs. 
While it is true that “[t]he medical model of the Eighth Amendment will 
 
183  Id. at 632. 
184  Id. 
185  See De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The parties [in 
De’Lonta I] subsequently reached a settlement in which VDOC acknowledged De’lonta’s 
serious medical need and agreed to provide continuing treatment.”).  In 2011, Ophelia 
De’Lonta again sued VDOC officials for denying her gender-affirming surgery, and defeated 
VDOC’s 12(b)(6) motion in the Fourth Circuit, in part because prison officials ignored the 
WPATH Standards of Care’s recommendation that those suffering from GID have access to 
surgery. See id. at 522–24.  The Fourth Circuit also held that the district court erred because 
VDOC providing some level of treatment did not mean VDOC officials met the burden of 
the Eighth Amendment.  See id. at 526. De’lonta v. Johnson reinforces the reasoning of its 
predecessor De’Lonta v. Angelone, reapplying the same skepticism of VDOC officials’ 
medical decisions to again enable De’Lonta’s claim to move forward.  The Ninth Circuit 
also cited De’lonta v. Johnson in its reversal of a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a 
transwoman’s Eighth Amendment claim. Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 
2015) (citing De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff not 
required to point to medical opinion in her favor for her denial of care claim to be 
plausible)).  Rosati points to the viability of the De’Lonta I approach to more thoroughly 
questioning prison medical expertise in Eighth Amendment cases across circuits.  See 791 
F.3d at 1040 (“Rosati plausibly alleges her symptoms . . . are so severe that prison officials 
recklessly disregarded an excessive risk to her health by denying SRS [“sex reassignment 
surgery”] solely on the recommendation of a physician’s assistant with no experience in 
transgender medicine.”). 
186  De’lonta, 708 F.3d at 522. 
187  Id. at 526 (“Appellees [VDOC] have provided De’lonta with some treatment 
consistent with the GID Standards of Care . . . .”). 
188  See De’lonta I, 330 F.3d at 636 (explaining that in reversing summary judgment the 
court “make[s] no comment on the merits of any issues not yet addressed by the district 
court”). 
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always be somewhat in conflict with a conception of gender identity based 
only on self-identification,”189 the current regime of prisoner/patient being fit 
into a fixed binary checklist like that of the DSM-V190 can be shifted into a 
model more like the UCSF’s, where the patient sets the checklist for the 
doctor to fulfill.191  Getting those standards into the courtroom may be 
possible where a court makes the inferential leap of Kothmann, uses a more 
objective focus on official knowledge of gender-affirming care as in Wolfe, 
or uses the suffering of the inmate as the litmus test for treatment as in 
Norsworthy.  It may also be possible when courts question the basis of 
medical decisions in the record as in De’Lonta I, or when facts show that 
officials knew what other care models are available as in Diamond.  These 
cases show that new care guidelines can make it behind bars when courts do 
not let officials hide behind the Eighth Amendment’s subjective prong.  
These cases present palatable ways to incorporate self-determination into 
Eighth Amendment cases, with the hope that such care models erode fixed 
binary conceptions of gender in the law generally, perhaps as a first push 
away from legitimizing gender via medicine across the board.  The other hope 
is that prisoner-defined care will return the incarcerated individual’s 
definition of self into the Eighth Amendment equation, thereby diluting the 
current emphasis on expert and official viewpoints.192 
CONCLUSION 
In response to the pathologizing of TGNC persons via medical 
diagnosis, “transgender activists and progressive psychiatrists have argued 
that the diagnosis should be eliminated altogether and that transgender 
individuals should be considered to be engaging in an act of self-
determination, an exercise of autonomy.”193  An approach based on self-
determination rather than external medical definition may also solve some of 
the roadblocks put in front of GNC prisoners by expanding rights to care 
beyond only cases where a prisoner seeks permanent transition.  As Silpa 
Maruri points out in the context of pathologizing trans status, “GID and its 
relationship to the Eighth Amendment remains a complicated problem, 
implicating the tension between the desire of transgender people to access 
 
189  Halbach, supra note 34, at 482. 
190  See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 58 at § 302.85 (listing factors for GD 
diagnosis). 
191  See UCSF, supra note 10, at 70 (“The approach to hormone therapy should be 
guided by the person’s desired configuration of secondary sex characteristics.”). 
192  See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub 
nom. Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059, (2015) (finding error in the district court second-
guessing prison medical expertise). 
193  See Maruri, supra note 25, at 811. 
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the means to achieve self-definition through transitioning and the 
compromise of self-definition that transgender people must make by 
accepting a GID di[a]gnosis [sic].”194  The same is true of GNC inmates who 
may seek care by filing claims in courtrooms where a medical diagnosis 
impliedly based in the binary is the only proven ticket to gender-affirming 
care.195  GNC prisoners have to fit the GID/GD model of having a “gender 
problem” to satisfy court notions of medical need and the many demands of 
the Eighth Amendment.  Plaintiffs must show that prison officials know of 
(subjective intent and knowledge)196 and are thus “able” to treat the gender 
“condition” (objective serious medical need)197 before that Section 1983 
claim will hit its target.  The kind of treatment officials can provide is 
partially up for grabs depending on how a court deploys the Eighth 
Amendment’s mean subjective barb.198  Once a court is willing to question 
the treatment prisons provide (or deny), newer GNC-inclusive standards of 
care can enter the scene. 
As a step toward establishing a right to define one’s own gender, 
medical diagnosis can be used as a tool to legitimize self-determined identity 
even under the Eighth Amendment. Diagnoses pathologize TGNC 
individuals, but litigated carefully, they are one way of chipping away at the 
Eighth Amendment’s relentless emphasis on the subjectivity of prison 
officials and erasure of those injured—the prisoners. 
 
 
194  Id. at 821–22. 
195  See Oparah, supra note 9, at 247 (“[B]y producing a class of individuals who have 
been diagnosed with GID, and are undergoing or have completed SRS, the medical model 
creates a hierarchy of transgendered people.”  Because “the courts rely on evidence provided 
by medical experts regarding the legitimacy of a transgender individual’s claim, those who 
are not under a doctor’s care are excluded from legal protections.”). 
196  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
197  See Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 244 (D. Mass. 2012) (“[I]t is well 
established that GID may constitute a serious medical need.”). 
198  For example, a plaintiff can beat the subjective requirement by relying on the 
circumstantial evidence option of Farmer, which is an easier hurdle for plaintiffs to leap 
since they do not have to delve into the defendants’ minds.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825, 842–43 (1994) (holding that circumstantial evidence of knowledge of harm or risk may 
meet the subjective deliberate indifference requirement of the Eighth Amendment).  The 
Norsworthy court’s crediting of circumstantial evidence from Michelle Norsworthy’s 
complaint is a prime example of the slippage of subjective intent into more easily proven 
objective reasonableness based on surrounding facts: “The [complaint] does not allege that 
there was a genuine difference of medical opinion; rather, it alleges that Defendants’ 
purported reliance on the opinions of non-specialized, inexperienced health care providers 
was clearly unreasonable and pretextual and thus evidence of deliberate indifference.”   
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
